The feeble results of liberalization policies in Latin America are explained in terms of a multiple steady state model including a dynamic human development trap, endogenous technological change, technology transfer and trade. Divergent and convergent steady states, with and without a human development trap, exist under both autarchy and free trade. The model explains why import substitution is inferior to export promotion. While globalization is a necessary condition for convergence to development, it is not sufficient. Both trade and foreign direct investment create innovation assymetries hindering lagging countries that need to be balanced with export promotion and technological transfer for their successful integration with the global economy. In addition, so long as the human development trap persists, unskilled and skilled workers will have a conflict of interest between supporting human capital investment and innovation. If only innovation is supported, the human capital trap will persist. If mainly human capital investment is pursued, technology levels will fall behind; switching to innovation will be necessary eventually. The world growth rate is maximized by regulating globalization so as to attain development in all countries.
Introduction
In the Latin American context, a society-wide reevaluation of globalization is currently underway. The pro-market liberalization policies that have been followed for a decade and a half have only been mildly successful. These policies have essentially followed the Washington Consensus, consisting mainly of openning to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), maintaining macroeconomic stability, and entrusting economic development to market functioning. These policies were established as a response to the Latin American debt crisis in the 80's, in recognition of the demise of import substitution. The East Asian economies had espoused export promotion and experienced a transition to development. The expectation was that liberalization could put Latin American economies on the same path. Widespread dissatisfaction with the results has shifted economic policies towards government intervention for direct poverty alleviation in a series of countries.
An economic explanation is needed that can answer to this reality. Why was export promotion better than import substitution? Yet, why have the results of liberalization been meager? What role does the high level of inequality in Latin America play? Why do millions not believe in marketguided policies? Why is globalization perceived as unfair? Where to go from here to address the problems of poverty and development?
The objective of this chapter is to provide just such an explanation, fully grounded in economic theory. To do so, I combine several important strands of research. The first is research on economic growth. Over a decade of research has reached the consensus that differences in income per capita between countries are mainly due to differences in technology. 1 Thus, economic growth is mainly and above all the process through which technological levels of production rise. Thus to understand the impact of globalization on economic growth, it is necessary to understand how technological change takes place under trade and FDI.
How does the international allocation of production under trade and FDI affect the international allocation of innovation? 2 This question is examined 1 Studies attributing cross-country differences in per-capita GDP to differences in productivity, include Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1993) , Dollar and Wolff (1988) , Islam (1995) , Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) , Klenow and Rodriguez Clare (1997) , Prescott (1998) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Feyrer (2000) , Parente and Prescott (2000) , Easterly and Levine (2001) , Martin and Mitra (2001) . 2 Innovation is broadly understood to include research and development as well as by Mayer-Foulkes (2006a) , who finds the following natural, real, macroeconomic condition governing the international allocation of innovation under trade. Under trade, the volume of innovative sectors that a country can dominate is proportional, ceteris paribus, to its productive capacity. Lagging economies with low levels of productivity will capture only a small number of sectors. Since technological change occurs through innovative production, what this implies is that their rate of technological change will be low, even after taking technology transfer into account. Hence free trade introduces innovation imbalances between countries. The result is extended to include FDI, a salient feature of globalization both in the 19th and 20th Centuries, in Mayer-Foulkes (2006b) . When foreign investor produce abroad to benefit from cheap labor and cheap resources, as their profits rise so do their incentives to innovate. Moreover, innovation in the sectors they occupy in host countries is crowded out by their unassailable competition. Thus FDI generates asymmetric incentives to innovation that favor leading countries and compound the innovation imbalances introduced by trade. Technology transfer from FDI, which can play a very significant role favoring economic growth in the host country, tends to occurs with high enough intensity only under appropriate regulation or negotiation. It follows that development and underdevelopment persist as different steady states under globalization. This is a strong theoretical result. It relies only on the assumptions commonly used in models of trade or of endogenous technological change. The only market imperfection is the market power of innovators, a necessary condition for innovation.
These theoretical results can explain the simultaneous historical emergence from stagnation to modern economic growth, together with the appearance of underdevelopment, or Great Divergence (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006a) . Development and underdevelopment appeared and were stable, and the Great Divergence proceeded, not only under free trade but also under FDI through the First Great Age of Globalization (approximately from the 1820's to 1914), and up to the present (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006b ). The results apply equally well to the present era of globalization, which accelerated since the early 1980's.
Since technological leaders trade, their innovators enjoy global incentives for innovation. The steady states for closed economies will be lower. Openness is thus a necessary condition for development, for all except possibly the largest countries. As a consequence, an import substitution strategy is imitation and technology adoption. likely to exhaust itself when technology reaches levels requiring world market incentives for innovation. An export promotion strategy will not hit these limits. But openness is not a sufficient condition for development. Ceteris paribus, market forces will only make economies not lagging too far behind converge to the developed steady state. Market forces must be augmented with export promotion and technology adoption to provide enough push for a change of steady state.
And how is human development related to economic growth? The second strand of research I draw from is historical research on the strong, long-term, mutual impact between human development and economic growth. This research attributes about a third of long-term economic growth to improvements in health, that is, to human development. As economic development took place, tremendous changes in human health occurred. Life expectancy and average adult height and weight rose tremendously. 3 The synergism between technological and physiological improvements has produced a dynamic, long-term, culturally transmitted form of human evolution that is biological but not genetic, called by Fogel (2002) technophysio evolution. The term human development includes here the long-term dimension of change.
A third strand of research underlines the intergenerational nature of human development. Microeconomic studies have found that early child development (ECD) is a crucial link in the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status and in the adult correlation between health and income. Using the 1958 National Child Development Study, which follows all children born in Great Britain in the week of March 3, 1958, Case, Fertig and Paxson, (2003) find that, controlling for parental income, education and social status, children who experience poor health have significantly lower educational attainment, and significantly lower average adult health and earnings. Now, it is a commonly accepted fact that investment in human development in general and ECD in particular are characterized by market failures, in so far as the level of these investments depends heavily on parental wealth, rather than on the returns to human capital investment. Thus, from the economic point of view, the process of human development is characterized by market failures. 1841 and 1998; and from 29 to 60 years in India between 1930 . (Fogel, 2002 Cervellati, Matteo and Uwe Sunde, 2003.) To analyze the interaction of human development and economic growth under globalization, I construct a human development trap model representing an intergenerational poverty trap in human capital investment, set in the context of trade and endogenous technological change.
I now describe the human development trap model in some detail. It is an overlapping generations model in which altruistic parents make their children a bequest. A high enough bequest provides them with the opportunity for an indivisible investment in human capital. In the present context, this investment acquires both skills and the current human development potential. If the bequest is too low, the absence of credit markets makes the investment impossible. The construction closely follows Galor and Zeira's (1993) well known, simple, poverty trap model, and builds upon it in two ways.
First, the usual assumption of increasing returns to human capital is removed. Instead, investment indivisibilities and the absence of credit markets lead to an undersupply of human capital. Under the assumption that skilled and unskilled labor are complementary, undersupply implies that skills command extraordinary returns; higher than would be warranted by the opportunity costs of investment.
Second, a dynamic trap is defined, which subsists under economic growth. Poverty trap models are usually static and therefore unrealistic. Here the trap defines two population classes, one skilled, attaining the current human development potential, and able to bequeath its children with the next generation's human development potential. The other is unskilled, lives beneath the human development potential, and is unable to bequeath it. Yet both experience income growth as technology rises through time. 4 At lower levels of development, human capital may be thought to be more intensive in nutrition and health, while at higher levels, succesively higher levels of education become a more important component. This combination of inequality and growth is consistent with the extraordinary persistence of within-country inequality, at widely different income levels and growth rates. 5 I assume that, because of the non-marketable benefits of human development, including lifelong health, knowledge for living and life expectancy, the whole population will opt for human capital investment if given the oppor-4 Income growth does not make class differences trivial or irrelevant. At a 2% growth rate, a proportional class income gap of 4 represents a 70 year lag. 5 Anand and Kanbur (1993) , Deininger and Squire (1996) , Squire and Zou (1998) , Kanbur (2005) . As Kanbur (2005) states: "There is no statistical correlation between changes in per capita income and changes in inequality, taking countries as the unit of observation." tunity. The trap exists if the proportion of unskilled workers is high enough that human capital is undersupplied. If instead the trap disappears and skills become oversupplied, some skilled workers will work at unskilled jobs and the whole population will attain the current human development potential. Mayer-Foulkes (2006c) presents strong evidence for the existence of such a human development trap in contemporary Mexico, including extraordinary returns to education, high returns to ECD, and a multiple-peaked distribution of human capital across households. In fact, extraordinary returns to education, defined as returns significantly higher than OECD levels, exist, on average, throughout the underdeveloped world. 6 This constitutes evidence for the existence of either a poverty trap or a prolonged transition in human development (when the poor need several generations to attain the local human development potential) in non-OECD Asia, Latin America and Africa.
A simple, reduced-form expression for endogenous change includes the following components and completes the model. 1) Human capital raises production levels and contributes to technological change by increasing the resources for innovation. 2) Under trade, each sector produces for the global market and has higher resources for innovation. 3) The operation of comparative advantage also increases resources for innovation. 4) The transfer of ideas, which may rise under trade, also contributes to convergence. 5) However, under trade the number of innovation sectors, which depends on the relative size of each economy's GDP, will be small for lagging countries.
The result is an analysis of the interaction of multiple steady states across countries in the context of globalization, with the human development trap occurring within countries.
To see how the full model deepens the discussion on human development and economic growth, let us return to the comparison of East Asia and Latin America. Comparing the performance of the two regions, Birdsall, Ross & Sabot (1997) stress the two-way causality between human capital and inequality, on the one hand, and economic growth on the other. The success of the export-oriented development strategy was more labor and skill demanding. As higher growth was achieved, a higher GDP led to higher investments per pupil, higher educational quality, lower income inequality, and lower ab-solute levels of poverty. On the other hand, the unequal distribution of the quantity and quality of education in Latin America led to forgone opportunities in labor productivity and economic growth.
The two examples of interaction between economic growth and human development can be explained in two ways by the model. A simple explanation, not resorting to multiple steady states, is simply that policies, such as promoting exports and technology adoption, matter for the success of the productive sector under globalization. When higher rates of technological change are achieved, improvements in production raise the returns to education and the resources available for human capital investment.
A second, deeper explanation is the following. Latin America remained in a lower steady state, with lower returns to human capital, because of its higher levels of initial inequality, and because it followed a strategy of import substitution that not only did not promote trade but also depended on unregulated FDI that crowded out innovation. In contrast, East Asia converged to development. Enjoying lower levels of initial inequality, it followed a careful globalization strategy featuring export promotion and technology adoption, and experienced miracle growth as it changed steady state to become a successful global partner in trade and development, with high returns to human capital. It is worth noting that the larger East Asian countries, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, jealously nurtured their technological independence and avoided dependence on FDI. 7,8 A change of steady state perspective for East Asia is supported in detail in Wan's (2004) comparative country case studies.
An additional result that emerges from jointly analyzing human development and economic growth is a tension between the policy preferences of the skilled and unskilled. Assume that both human capital investment and innovation require government support. Skilled workers will favor innovation. Increases in productivity will raise the returns to human capital, while extraordinary returns to skills will fall with human capital investment on the unskilled. In contrast, unskilled workers favor human capital investment. This unlocks productive capabilities without the need for technological change. Under the skilled workers' preferred policies, the human development trap will persist. Under the unskilled workers' preferences, human capital investment will be carried out at the cost of worsening the country's relative technological lag. This could make it impossible to emerge from underdevelopment. In addition, once the human capital trap is overcome, government support will have to change its focus to technological change. This may require quite a strong institutional and policy shift, as occurred in the ex-socialist countries. The tension between policies to help the poor (here modeled as human capital investment) and policies for economic growth (here modeled as investment in technological change) is a significant problem in Latin America, as in much of the underdeveloped world. According to the model, both extremes generate inferior policies. However, in practice the two objectives can intersect: generating human capital to support technological change for export promotion is an example of an optimal combination. What does the model conclude? First, no special assumptions are necessary for the existence of multiple steady states under globalization -development and underdevelopment. The usual assumptions used in models of trade or endogenous technological change suffice, through a macroeconomic mechanism allocating innovation across countries. Second, increasing returns in human capital is not a necessary conditions for a human capital poverty trap to exist. It is enough if a large enough portion of families cannot endow their children with human capital -due to incomplete or malfunctioning markets. The ensuing undersupply will lead to extraordinary returns to skills and the population will divide into two classes, whose different living standards will evolve in parallel according to each country's technological level.
When these phenomena -human development, trade and innovation -are analyzed together, multiple steady states in human and technological development emerge that coexist under globalization. At the highest steady states the human development trap has disappeared and high levels of technology are enjoyed. At lower steady states the human development trap may persist and low levels of technology cannot be escaped. A diversity of growth experiences, including the likelihood in underdeveloped countries of pro-rich and pro-poor policy regimes, that is consistent with the true-life physiognomy of development and underdevelopment, is modelled.
We now let the model answer the questions that motivated this chapter.
Why was export promotion better than import substitution? Because high level technologies are based on innovations that require world-market incentives. Domestic markets of all but the largest countries cannot hope to support the innovative capacity of leading economies involved in world trade. The purposeful, strategic policies promoting exports and technology adoption that East Asian economies followed, supplied large markets and fed their economic growth.
Why have the results of liberalization been meager? Because globalization, that is, openness to trade and foreign investment, will not automatically lead to development. Success depends on economy size, human resource levels, and on implementing policies promoting exports and technology adoption. Other determinants of aggregate production, such as institutional and financial development, also affect steady state membership.
What role does the high level of inequality in Latin America play? Inequality, representing the presence of a human development trap and low levels of human resources, is a determinant of steady state membership. In its presence, and in the absence of policies truly promoting competitive technologies for the global market, development is impossible.
Why do millions not believe in market-guided policies? Because millions of people are subject to an intergenerational poverty trap that exists precisely because it is impervious to market forces. (This and the following answer are consistent with rational expectations.)
Why is globalization perceived as unfair? Because it provokes innovation imbalances and innovation crowding out favoring advanced countries.
Where to go from here? Globalization is a necessary condition for development. But it is not sufficient. What is required is to govern globalization through policies compensating the long-term imbalances it creates, favoring successful integration of weaker economies, promoting technology transfer, encouraging exports from lagging countries, bolstering universal knowledge integration. China has been successful at regulating trade and FDI, to ensure its own growth in the process of integration. To extend this to the many smaller countries, global governance and regulation is required. Macroeconomic measures for achieving control and coordination with the same objectives may exist as well, to be implemented as a part of global governance.
Furthermore, each of the trade and innovation models discussed here show that development is not a zero sum game. Leading countries' welfare depends essentially on the world growth rate, and this is maximized when the world is fully developed. This can only occur when human development is achieved everywhere and every country enjoys its full share of innovation. Concerted nutrition, health, skills, know-how, research and infrastructure transfers to the underdeveloped word are in the interest of leading countries, and constitute an instrument for global prosperity and peace.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses human development, ECD and technological change in further detail. Section 3 presents a concise, simple economic model defining a dynamic human development trap which is then interacted with economic growth. The mathematical results are summarized in words. Section 4 concludes.
2 Human development and economic growth 2.1 Human development
The concept of "Human Development", understood as an index of human well-being including education, health and income, drew wide attention with the 1990 UNDP Human Development Report, which "addresses, as its main issue, the question of how economic growth translates -or fails to translate -into human development." This question is addressed by the present model. First, it gives examples of growth policies under which the human development trap persists. Next, it shows that a trade-off and policy conflicts may exist between technological change and human development. Finally, it shows that a successful development path will be able to achieve human development.
Our point of departure is a more dynamic, long-term conception of human development, and its mutual interaction with economic growth. Historical and macroeconomic studies have shown that health accounts for at least one third of long-term economic growth, 9 with continuing importance to this day. 10 As mentioned above, these studies have uncovered momentous secular rises in stature, weight and life expectancy that form an integral part of long-term human development. However, microeconomic studies, using a unified conception of human capital including nutrition, health and education and measuring the impact of adult health on productivity, 11 have been unable to explain the historical magnitude of this impact. The appropriate explanation seems to emerge from a related field of study, the 'gradient' of adult health along income, which places childhood health at the origin of the gradient. 12 More generally, ECD is a crucial link in human development. 13 Thus, the intergenerational transmission of human development plays a fundamental role. However, this transmission of well-being is hampered by a series of market failures limiting human capital investment on children and inducing vicious cycles or poverty traps, whose nature changes as development proceeds. These have been studied succesively by different generations of economists. An example occurring at low levels of development is the productivity trap due to low nutrition addressed by the efficiency theory of wages, 14 whose study has documented substantial effects of nutrition on labor productivity. 15 At later stages, when education becomes important, low human capital traps can occur through increasing returns or indivisible investments in education. 16 Other mechanisms that could lead to poverty traps in human capital accumulation include: unequal inheritance of assets such as social capital, knowledge, or early child development, 17 child labor traps (Emerson and Souza, 2003) , and so on.
Human development can therefore be understood as an intergenerational process of human capital accumulation, slowed by the presence of market failures limiting the necessary investment, in which early child development plays a critical role.
Economic growth through technological change
As mentioned above, econometric studies at the cross-country level have concluded that productivity differences are the main sources of income differences. Another underlying factor is human capital. 18 These two factors, technological progress and human capital accumulation, are in turn important determinants of capital accumulation. Thus recent growth models often concentrate, for simplicity, on the first two elements. As mentioned above, an additional challenge has been to explain the diversity of growth experiences, including the Great Divergence, persistent underdevelopment, rapid convergence and miracle growth.
The Schumpeterian analysis of endogenous technological change first concentrated on R&D in developed countries as the source of economic growth Howitt, 1988, 1992) . A general concept of innovation, including technological transfer and adoption in a multi-country model, can explain convergence (Howitt, 2000) . It can also be used to address problems of development including divergence. For example, the existence of a human capital threshold distinguishing R&D from implementation can give rise to convergence clubs 19 and explain long-term divergence . Institutional differences affecting financial development can determine technological absorption rates and also explain convergence clubs and long-term divergence (Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005) .
These models make specific economic assumptions that can explain underdevelopment. The trade and innovation models mentioned above do not require such assumptions. (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006a , 2006b .
The basic assumptions of these Schumpeterian models are the following. First, innovation in both lagging and leading countries, broadly understood to include technological adoption, is costly 20 and responds to the incentives for world profits. The simplest way to represent this is by assuming innovators are world monopolists. Second, innovation investment aimed at achieving proportional productivity jumps, which in principle are proportionally costly, 21 obtains higher than proportional returns in lagging countries, because of their access to the advanced contemporary knowledge of the leading countries (technology transfer). This is Gerschenkron's (1952) advantage of backwardness in technological change, a force for convergence.
These assumptions are sufficient to endogenously determine the aggregate allocation of innovation sectors between countries through productive capacity and price equalization. If learning is increasing in the number of sectors in which innovation is performed, it follows that:
Under trade, the volume of innovative production that a country can maintain (and therefore its rate of technological change) is proportional, ceteris paribus, of its productive capacity, after technology transfer and innovation. Hence its rate of technological change is an increasing function of its productive capacity.
This result is enough for multiple steady states and divergence to emerge, which thus requires no special assumptions (such as financial constraints or thresholds for R&D) to simultaneously explain development and underdevelopment in the context of globalization.
The model
Our discussion in the section on human development leads to the following stylized facts about long-term human development. First, technological improvements lead to technophysio evolution; improvements in stature, health and longevity. Second, higher human development provides inputs for raising technological levels. Third, the presence of market failures inhibits the human capital investment that each new generation must make to achieve 20 In his survey on international technology diffusion Keller (2004) finds international diffusion is neither inevitable nor automatic, requiring domestic investments. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2001) have also argued that R&D by the receiving country is a necessary input to technology transfer. 21 This is the fishing out effect. current levels of human development; only the wealthier part of the population may reach the human development potential that is currently possible, while the poorer part may remain trapped away from achieving its full potential. Here we formalize these ideas in a concise economic model of a human development trap and its interaction with economic growth. A classical example of a static human capital trap is provided by Galor and Zeira (1993) . This trap is based on the need for an indivisible investment for acquiring skills, and on the presence of a credit constraint not allowing the poor to make the investment. I take this model, as presented in Basu (2003, section 3.4), as point of reference to construct a dynamic human development trap model.
The human development trap model
Consider an economy with S t skilled workers, each with human capital A t , so that the aggregate human capital stock is H t = A t S t , and with L t unskilled workers. A single good is produced according to the production function
, with technology level also A t . Φ is a fixed productivity effect. Wage rates for labor and human capital are therefore given by w L t = βΦA t (S t /L t ) 1−β and w S t = (1−β)ΦA t (L t /S t ) β , and are proportional to A t . Note that increasing returns to human capital are not assumed in the model. Instead, what is assumed is that an undersupply of human capital, which will result from barriers to its acquisition, results in a higher, endogenous wage gap between skilled and unskilled wages.
In period t, each young person receives a bequest x t , and decides whether to invest hA t units in acquiring an indivisible package of A t units of human capital consisting of ECD, health and education ("becoming skilled"). The alternative is to work earning ηw L t , where 0 < η ≤ 1 represents the ratio of child to adult wages. Any remaining bequest is saved and earns an interest rate r. For simplicity, a the credit market is assumed to be missing: it is impossible to borrow to acquire nutrition, health and education. In the second period of life, each adult earns y t+1 , the sum of her skilled or unskilled wage (w S t+1 or w L t+1 ) and accrued savings. Each adult consumes c t+1 and decides on a bequest b t+1 to her one child. Young people maximize:
to the budget constraint c t+1 + b t+1 = y t+1 . The utility function contains two terms. The first represents preferences over consumption and bequests. The second term represents the non-labor benefits of acquiring health and education. δ t takes the value 1 if skills and health capital were acquired, and 0 otherwise, while u H A t (with u H constant) measures the nonlabor benefits of human capital. For simplicity, so as not to include consumption in both periods to define a discout rate, the interest rate is assumed to be exogenous. Assume that the model parameters are such that 1) independently of the ratio S t /L t of skilled to unskilled workers, anybody receiving a bequest x t ≥ A t h will decide to acquire human capital; 2) given a technological level A t , skilled workers's children can acquire skills and human development; 3) the maximum feasible level of human development is bounded.
For now, suppose that the rate of technological change A t+1 /A t = 1 + g t is constant and exogenous, and define the deflated variablex t = x t /A t .
Proposition 1. Under these assumptions, a higher steady statex High in which skills are acquired exists. A lower steady statex Low in which skills are not acquired also exists (see Figure 1) if the skilled to unskilled workers ratio lies below the critical level
In this case S t and L t remain constant. For higher growth rates g t , higher skilled to unskilled ratios are necessary to escape the trap, and returns to education are higher.
Figure 1 about here
The proof is in Appendix A. At both steady states, wages rise with the technological level A t , implying growing levels of nutrition and health even for the unskilled. However, the unskilled population is trapped away from reaching the full current human development potential, which is only accessible at the higher steady state. In this sense, the model defines a dynamic poverty trap. The rising indivisible human capital investment models successive investments at different stages of development, such as adequate nutrition, literacy, primary school, secondary school, higher education, and so on, as mentioned above.
As long as the trap exists, children would like to borrow to acquire human capital. Thus, investing in human capitaloffers higher returns than the interest rate, that is, extraordinary returns to investment.
Note that if all workers are skilled, wages will equalize (w L t = w S t ). Skilled and unskilled jobs will be allocated in the ratio S t /L t = (1 − β)/β. If the population numbers
If instead a human development trap holds, skilled labor will be undersupplied and
Production will be less efficient. If the dynamic trap condition (1) does not hold, a prolonged transition may nevertheless take place, in which several generations must pass before the offspring of a poor dynasty achieve the full human development potential. Under a prolonged transition, incomplete markets slow the transition to a steady state through prolonged, systematic, under investment in human capital. A transition under perfect markets would be faster.
Endogenous technological change
A simple equation for endogenous technological change is now stated, taking into account the results in the trade and innovation models we have mentioned, which are fully worked out from microeconomic principles in Mayer-Foulkes (2006a , 2006b .
For an open economy, set an endogenous rate of technological change
The first entry expresses that firms innovate more the higher their level of production. It is assumed here that firms serve a demand proportional to the world product, and that they innovate with certainty. Division by A t accounts for the fishing out effect: innovation at higher technological levels is proportionally harder. φ is a constant including the propensity with which income is invested in innovation, depending for example on institutional arrangements. Decreasing returns to innovation investment in each given sector is assumed, so 0 < γ < 1. 22 22 Note that under this simple specification the returns to innovation are unbounded. It will follow that the scale of resources applied to innovation has an unbounded effect on growth. However, under a more complex, bounded specification, the scale effect would be bounded as well.
The second entry expresses the effect of the macroeconomic condition governing innovation allocation between countries, also mentioned above. Ceteris paribus, the innovation sectors a country can dominate is proportional to its productive capacity. We include a fixed country effect θ for country factors that may affect innovation races, and the corresponding average world parameterθ World . Setting κ = 1 assumes that learning only occurs in those sectors which are dominated by the given country, and that the country's technological change is the average of technological change in all sectors. Setting κ = 0 would assume that knowledge for production can be completely specialized; a country would need no knowledge of the sectors it does not produce in. Here it is assumed that κ lies somewhere in between. In fact, it is assumed that γ < κ < 1,that is, that decreasing returns to specialization hold, even in the presence of convergence forces. Economies investing all of their innovation in a tiny segment of sectors will obtain less technological change than if the investment were spread in more sectors.
In the third entry,Ā t is the leading technological edge, assumed here to be generated in some other country or countries. Thus the economy we are concerned with is a follower economy. Technology is assumed to rise faster for lower relative technological levels a t = A t /Ā t , due to technology transfer from leading countries, an advantage of backwardness effect generating convergence (Gerschenkron, 1952) . The functional form chosen here assumes the convergence effect is bounded by exp(χ FT ) as a t becomes small. This makes divergence in growth rates possible under autarchy.
Under autarchy, the same equation is assumed to hold, with Y World t replaced by Y t andθ World by θ. Hence
It is reasonable to assume χ A < χ FT , i.e. that technology transfer works less strongly under autarchy than under free trade, when not only ideas but also goods travel between countries. Also, in the presence of comparative advantage (modelled fully in Mayer-Foulkes, 2006a) , it can be assumed that the fixed country productivity effects are higher under free trade than under autarchy, so Φ A < Φ FT . 23 Let λ = Y World Summarizing, technological change is governed by:
As mentioned above, there is a scale effect in this equation. Define the human resources level
Given a population size N t , HR t is bounded by β β (1 −β) 1−β N t , rising to this level with government investment in human capital of the unskilled. When a human development trap holds, HR t will be lower than it could be and hence technological change slower. A more complete model might also include a higher demand for human capital for innovation than for production. The steady state found in Proposition 1 extends to a free trade or autarchic steady state in relative technological levels if the relative technological level a t is also at a steady state. There are two types of steady states a * . Let H X represent either H FT or H FT . The first type of steady state is a * = 0. This exists if and only if H X (0) < 1, because then lim t→∞ a t = 0. When a follower economy approaches this type of steady state, its growth rate becomes lower than the leading technological edge growth rate:
The second type of steady state occurs for 0 < a * ≤ 1. It exists when H X (a * ) = 1. The growth rate is then 1 +ḡ, and the economy tends to a fixed technological lag a * .
For ease of language, we say that at these two types of steady states technology "diverges in growth rates" or "diverges in levels" (equivalently "converges in growth rates").
In the autarchic case, H A (a t ) is a decreasing function. At most a single steady state exists. In the case of free trade, the following properties hold. tage, the full human development potential may only be feasible under free trade, when
3) H FT (a t ) has a single maximum at a t = κ − γ ∈ (0, 1). 4) H FT is increasing in φ, θ/θ World , Φ FT , HR t , χ FT , and decreasing in λ andḡ.
For the proof of these properties, on which Proposition 2 and its Figures  2 and 3 are based, see Appendix B.
Figures 2 and 3 about here
Proposition 2. Under autarchy, a follower economy has the following steady states, which depend only on its parameters (see Figure 2) . A.1 If H A (0) ≤ 1, there is divergence in growth rates. The absolute rate of growth tends from below to (φΦ A HR t ) γ exp(χ A ) < 1 +ḡ.
A.2 If H A (0) > 1 and H A (1) < 1 there is a steady state 0 < a * < 1 at which the economy diverges in levels, with growth rate 1 +ḡ.
A.3 If H A (1) > 1, the follower economy will overtake the leaders.
In case A.1, steady state growth rates, and in case A.2, steady state levels, are increasing in the propensity to innovate φ, fixed productivity effects Φ A , human resources HR t , and technology transfer rates as measured by χ A .
Under free trade, the following dynamic configurations for a follower economy exist. The steady states may depend on initial conditions as well as parameters (see Figure 3 ).
FT.1 If H FT (κ − γ) ≤ 1, the only stable steady state is a * = 0. The follower's growth rate decreases towards 0. In the special case H FT (κ − γ) = 1 there is an unstable steady state a * = κ − γ, from which the economy converges to a * = 0 under any negative perturbation.
If H FT (κ − γ) > 1, a stable and an unstable steady states a * 0 , a * 1 , exist, satisfying 0 = a * 0 < a * 1 < κ − γ and H FT (a * 0 ) = 0, H FT (a * 1 ) = 1, H FT (a * 1 ) > 0. Two possibilities arise:
FT.2 H FT (1) ≤ 1. A further stable steady state a * 2 ∈ (κ − γ, 1] exists with H FT (a * 2 ) < 0.
FT.3 H FT (1) > 1. In this case H FT (a t ) > 1 on (a * 1 , 1]. For initial values a t 0 < a * 1 , the follower economy tends to a * 0 = 0, where its growth rate descends to 0. For initial values a t 0 > a * 1 , in case FT.2 the follower economy tends to a * 2 , where it diverges in levels, with growth rate 1 +ḡ. In case FT.3 it overtakes the leading economy. If the follower becomes a leader, a new world or leading technological edge growth rate will emerge.
It follows from property 4) of H FT that a) the higher the follower's propensity for innovation; b) the more sectors it dominates; c) the higher its fixed productivity effects; d) the more efficient its allocation between skilled and unskilled labor; and e) the higher the rate of technology transfer, the higher will its rate of technological change be. The larger the world economy or its rate of growth, though, the lower its relative steady state. At steady states divergent in growth rates or levels, these comparative statics translates into growth or level effects.
Note that backward countries may diverge in growth rates under free trade even when they might converge to the leading growth rate under autarchy. At any given level a t , the relative growth rate under free trade is higher than under autarchy,
The term on the left hand side equals Y t /Y World t , so the condition depends on the relative size of the aggregate product. In addition, if the follower is good at capturing innovation sectors (θ high), enjoys high benefits from comparative advantage (Φ κ FT sufficiently larger than Φ γ A ), and if technological transfer under trade is sufficiently high (χ FT sufficiently larger than χ A ), growth will tend to be higher under trade. Policies for human development will raise L β t S 1−β t and contribute to the viability of growth under free trade. Promoting exports and technological change, as well as concentrating on comparative advantage (that is, raising θ, χ FT and Φ κ FT ), also contribute to growth under free trade. Steady state membership also depends on institutional and financial development, which can raise aggregate production.
Finally, one defining characteristic of the economic unit whose size is referred to by the model, is that it shares knowledge for production and for skill formation. One policy for breaking the size constraint is therefore knowledge integration. Integration through trade and investment must be complemented by integration in education and technology.
Under autarchy, the behavior of the follower economy only depends on its parameters. Instead, under free trade its initial conditions matter. If they are low enough, a follower country will diverge in growth rates.
The following corollary restates the results to bring out the role of human development in economic growth and globalization (proof in Appendix B).
Corollary 3. The following conclusions about globalization and human development hold.
HD.1 If human resources HR t in the follower country are too low, it will necessarily diverge in growth rates. A minimum level HR t for converging in growth rates under free trade is given by the condition H FT (κ − γ) > 1, or:
.
HD.2 Growth will only be faster under free trade than under autarchy if human resources HR t are sufficiently high, as in (6); otherwise too many innovation sectors will be lost to trading partners.
HD.3 Economic growth performance is better for higher levels of human resources HR t . At steady states divergent in growth rates or levels, higher human resources HR t translate into growth or level effects. For higher human resource levels HR t , the follower country is more likely to converge rather than diverge in growth rates, since the threshold level a * 1 is lower. HD.4 If a government carries out policies for human capital investment for the children of the unskilled, a steady state can only occur once human resources reach their maximal level HR t = β β (1 − β) 1−β N t and the human development trap has disappeared. Under autarchy, the economy will eventually converge to a steady state diverging in levels only. Under free trade, the feasibility for convergence in growth rates will be maintained only if from some time on in the trajectory, a t > a * 1 (with HR t = β β (1 − β) 1−β N t ). HD.5 An economy converging to a * 2 will be able to achieve human development. However, human capital equality does not guarantee development.
Summary of results
The propositions concentrate on follower economies. They make the assumption that convergence forces are bounded; this makes divergence possible under autarchy. In the autarchic case, a single stable steady state exists, independently of initial conditions. Country parameters and the level of human development determine whether the follower economy diverges in growth rates, diverges in levels, or overtakes the leading economy.
In the case of free trade, for low country parameters and/or low levels of human development, divergence in growth rates is the only steady state. For higher parameters or levels of human development, follower economies with sufficiently high initial conditions will either converge in levels or overtake the leading economy.
There is a scale effect inherent in the technological change model. However, this need not be unbounded. If innovation rates are bounded, so will the scale effect. Because of the scale effect, the relevant measure translating human development into growth is human resources, meaning aggregate units of combined skilled and unskilled labor. Given that there is an optimal ratio of skilled to unskilled labor inputs, under a human development trap, human capital undersupply will reduce aggregate human resources. Human resources affect economic growth under free trade as follows. First, there is a minimum level of human resources needed for convergence in growth rates. If these are too low, the follower country will necessarily diverge in growth rates. Second, there is also a minimum human resource requirement for growth to be faster under free trade than under autarchy; otherwise too many innovation sectors will be lost to trading partners. Third, productive efficiency will be higher for higher levels of human resources, increasing resources for innovation. Hence, at steady states diverging in growth rates or levels, higher human resources translate to higher growth rates or levels. Fourth, follower country are more likely to converge rather than diverge in growth rates for higher levels of human resources. Fifth, a successful development path will be able to achieve human development. On the other hand, since the level of human development depends on the level of technology, equality does not of its own guarantee development.
The presence or absence of government human capital investment raising the skilled to unskilled ratio S t /L t is a condition of the steady state. A human development trap can only exist at steady state if there is no human capital investment for the poor. Conversly, if there is human capital investment, S t /L t will rise until the human development trap disappears before a steady state can be reached. Beginning from low levels of development, even if it is feasible to reach a higher steady state, too much or too little investment in human capital may make this impossible. Even if equality is achieved, underdevelopment may persist, with technological levels diverging in levels or growth rates from leading countries. A careful balance is needed between supporting human capital investment -an essential component of growthand a favorable insertion in globalization, to reach the highest technological levels.
Optimal world growth rate
It has been assumed above that only research in leading countries advances the leading technological edge. This may be a reasonable assumption if follower countries are lagging sufficiently far behind. However, if they converge to the leading countries, eventually their research will also push the leading technological edge. In this case, under trade, the world growth rate will rise. Since the leading countries' welfare increases with the world growth rate, convergence of the underdeveloped countries is in their long-term interest. This result is proved formally in Mayer-Foulkes (2006a , 2006b ).
Final remarks
The model presented here can explain persistent income inequality between and within countries, compare import substitution and export promotion, and account for episodes of miracle growth. It shows that development and underdevelopment can coexist as steady states in the context of globalization.
The results rely on just two types of market imperfections, both of which are commonly accepted facts. Increasing returns to education or in production are not assumed. The first type of imperfection are incomplete markets in human capital investment. Children are not endowed by the market with their human capital investment, in spite of its notable returns. Instead, initial conditions in wealth determine the incidence of investment. This problem can result in a human development trap that subdivides the population into classes and can persist under economic growth. Strong evidence for the presence of such a trap in Mexico is provided by Mayer-Foulkes (2006c) . Surely this is not an isolated phenomenon.
The second type of imperfection is market power derived from innovation. To remove any doubt on the relevance of market power, note that aggregate world exports in 1998 amounted to US $7 trillion, while aggregate sales from foreign affiliates of transnational corporations amounted to US $11 trillion (UNCTAD, 1999) . The combined sales of the top 200 corporations were higher in 2000 than the combined economies of all countries minus the biggest 9; that is, they surpassed the combined economies of 182 countries (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000) . Property rights over innovation, and the resulting market power, are considered a condition for its existence. As has been explained, under free trade the corresponding assumptions in the theory of endogenous technological change imply the existence of multiple steady states (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006a , 2006b .
These two market imperfections can generate a diverse set of steady states that is consistent with the broad physiognomy of economic growth: widely varying incomes and growth rates, episodes of miracle growth (understood as transitions between steady states), economic growth without inequality reduction, positive and negative impacts of trade on growth, convergence to parallel growth paths of a large group of countries, long-term divergence and stagnation, pro-rich and pro-poor policy regimes.
The idea that under globalization resources will flow so that economies equalize is based on the predominance of competitive markets. If this were the reality, the Great Divergence would not have occured, and development would have spread equally around the world since its origins. For, what forces could keep competitive markets so out of balance?
Sound global economic policies must recognize the powerful impact of these market imperfections in human development and innovation. Globalization -free trade and FDI -generates innovation imbalances that must be compensated for lagging countries to develop. It is a matter of experience that countries that have implemented complementary measures promoting their exports and regulating FDI, so as to develop their technological capabilities, have been able to achieve sustained economic growth for long periods, that is, miracle growth. When this has occured, as in the case of the Asian tigers and China, both the countries involved and their commercial partners were benefited. Such policies can be implemented by individual countries or regions. However, it would be optimal if they were carried out as an integral part of global governance. The very institutions that regulate trade and investment, WTO, IMF and the World Bank, must commit to balance the incentives for innovation and technological change, to ensure that globalization brings economic development for all.
The model shows that in the presence of a human development trap there is a natural policy conflict between emphasizing human development or technological change. Both extremes have their problems. If only technological change is pursued, the human development trap can persist. If only human capital investment is pursued, the technological lag may become too large for development to be feasible. Eventually a change of policies will become inevitable. From this point of view, human development objectives such as the UN Millennium Development Goals are essential components of economic growth.
Development is not a zero-sum game. It is in the economic interest of leading countries to foster productive and innovative capabilities around the world. The world growth rate is maximal when all countries are developed. Succesful technology transfer and adoption will raise economic growth in both lagging and leading countries. In turn, economic growth will increment the incentives and the resources to dismantle the human development trap, liberating vast economic and human potential. By making globalization successful for all, such policies can provide a foundation for global peace and prosperity.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Maximization of the utility function yields consumption and bequests c t+1 = αy t+1 , b t+1 = (1 − α)y t+1 . Utility levels are given by U t = ε(α)y t+1 + δ t u H A t , with ε(α) = α α (1 − α) 1−α . Unskilled and skilled workers' income is given by: y L t+1 = (x t + ηw L t )(1 + r) + w L t+1 , y S t+1 = (x t − A t h)(1 + r) + w S t+1 . Note that if at any time the ratio of skilled to unskilled S t /L t labor rises above (1 − )/, then human capital becomes oversupplied. Some skilled workers will work at unskilled jobs, and wages will equalize at w S t = w L t = ε()A t . In general, w L t ≤ ε()A t ≤ w S t . Human capital will be acquired just for its non-labor benefits if u H is large enough:
This condition is assumed. Note that since w S t+1 − w L t+1 is proportional to A t+1 , returns to skills rise with economic growth. For the skilled workers' young to afford skills, it is necessary that
This condition is also assumed. Hence anybody receiving a bequest x t ≥ A t h will acquire human capital, and the full bequest dynamics are given by:
Note b(0) > 0. Hence the lower steady state exists when the unskilled cannot acquire human capital, that is, when
Under conditions (8) and (9), the skilled to unskilled ratio remains constant, so S t+1 /L t+1 = S t /L t . Hence we can write the deflated bequest dynamics
These dynamics are depicted in Figure 1 . The trap holds ifb (h − , S t /L t ) < h, yielding condition (1). The right hand side of this condition is an increasing function of g t , so the trap's hold becomes tighter if the rate of growth rises. For the higher steady state to exist, it is still necessary for the gradient of b(x t , S t /L t ) alongx t ≥ h be less than 1, that is (1 − α)(1 + r)(1 + g t ) < 1. Together with (8), this means human development is bounded and viable, as assumed.
6 Appendix B
Properties of H FT (a t ). Observe that the function f (a t ) = a κ−γ t exp (1 − a t ) satisfies f (0) = 0, f (1) = κ − 1 − γ < 0, since 0 < γ < κ < 1. Also, f (a t ) is quasiconcave, since
is positive for a t < κ−γ and negative for a t > κ−γ, with its unique maximum at κ − γ.
Proof of Corollary 3. Parts 1, 2 are proved in their statements. Part 3 follows directly from (4) and the properties of H FT (a t ), H A (a t ). Part 4 is evident as follows. So long as there is human capital investment the ratio S t /L t will change. Hence a steady state cannot be reached until the human development trap ceases to exist. Convergence in growth rates (or divergence in levels) means reaching a steady state a * 2 . Since a * 2 > a * 1 , a converging trajectory must from some time on satisfy this inequality. The first statement in Part 5 follows from noting that at any point in such a trajectory a t some finite proportion of income can be invested in human capital without compromising a t > a * 1 . Under this condition achieving human development takes finite time. On the other hand, human capital equality, or equivalently human development, is also possible at a lower, divergent, steady state.
Deflated bequest to next generation,
High NoTrap Children who inherit more than hA t (deflated to h) chose to be skilled. They earn higher wages and bequest more to their children. Wages for skilled and unskilled workers are endogenous and depend on the aggregate ratio of skilled to unskilled workers S t /L t . If this ratio lies below the critical level η Crit , there is a trap, which otherwise disappears. Near the critical level η Crit , workers receiving bequests below hA t will go through a prolonged transition towards the higher steady state. Human development is "viable and bounded" when steady state High NoTrap x exists. 
